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INTRODUCTION 
The authors presented the articles in this volume in February 2020 at a 
conference that was open to students, lawyers, and the general public. As we 
write this Introduction several months later, we are keenly aware that such a 
conference would not have been possible under our changed circumstances.1 
An even greater change has occurred within the legal system. Most trials have 
been delayed, and only the most urgent hearings happen in person.2 Courts 
are wrestling with when, and how, they will reopen. Given this new legal 
 
 * Thanks to Lyz Riley for exceptional editing help. An earlier version of the ideas in this 
introduction was presented at an ABA Criminal Justice workshop by Chad Flanders, and he 
is grateful for the comments of Kate Weisburd, Andrew Ferguson, and Avlana Eisenberg on 
that occasion. 
 1 In April, Governor J.B. Pritzker of Illinois extended Illinois’ “stay-at-home” order 
through May 30. Read the Full Modified Stay-at-Home Order from Gov. Pritzker Now in 
Question, NBC CHICAGO (Updated Apr. 30, 2020, 12:01 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/
news/local/read-the-full-modified-stay-at-home-order-from-gov-pritzker-now-in-
question/2262609/ [https://perma.cc/MEK6-3DU7]. 
 2 See, e.g., Alanna Durkin Richer & Michael Tarm, Justice Delayed: COVID-19 Crisis 
Upends Courts System Across US, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://
www.timesfreepress.com/news/breakingnews/story/2020/apr/09/justice-delayed-covid-19-
crisis/520208/ [https://perma.cc/LF3B-95UG]. 
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reality, the articles in this volume might seem, at first blush, not only as if 
they were written in a prior time, but also as if they were written for a prior 
time. 
Yet the urgency of the questions addressed in this volume has been, if 
anything, heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic. We have seen striking 
changes in the attitudes of state officials to incarceration in a very short time. 
Since the beginning of the pandemic, many more people have been released, 
rather than detained, before trial.3 Low-level offenders are being sentenced 
to home confinement.4 More police are giving warnings for low-level 
offenses rather than making arrests,5 and prosecutors have established 
policies against prosecuting those arrested for low-level offenses.6 As a 
result, prison and jail populations are declining, although it is too soon to tell 
how dramatic or permanent that decline will be. 
These moves are driven by the fear—and, in many cases, the reality—
of COVID-19 outbreaks in jails and prisons.7 Correctional institutions are 
now virus hot spots,8 and states and localities do not want to be responsible 
for the human suffering or for the costs of caring for a rash of new patients. 
At the same time, these reforms are in line with what so-called progressive 
 
 3 See Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Updated Sept. 11, 
2020) https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html [https://perma.cc/G62T-FTE8]. 
 4 See Jacqueline Policastro, Allison Maass & Tyler Smith, More Inmates Released to 




 5 Police Responses to COVID-19, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (updated July 8, 2020), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/police-responses-covid-19 
[https://perma.cc/UZM8-8E7U]. 
 6 CHRIS W. SURPRENANT, COVID-19 AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 2 (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/covid-19-policy-brief-series/covid-19-and-pretrial-
detention [https://perma.cc/66KS-5DJX]. 
 7 See UCLA Law Covid-19 Behind Bars Data Project, UCLA LAW, https://law.ucla.edu
/centers/criminal-justice/criminal-justice-program/related-programs/covid-19-behind-bars-
data-project/ [https://perma.cc/6EXT-UJPZ]; see also Alice Speri, Mass Incarceration Poses 
a Uniquely American Risk in the Coronavirus Pandemic, INTERCEPT (May 6, 2020, 10:01 
AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/05/06/coronavirus-prison-jail-mass-incarceration/ [https:
//perma.cc/277W-SYLY]. 
 8 See Anna Flagg & Joseph Neff, Why Jails Are So Important in the Fight Against 
Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (updated May 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31
/upshot/coronavirus-jails-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/55S8-JAN4] (“Both in large jails 
located in virus hot spots like New York and Seattle and in smaller jails across the country, 
the churn of people moving in and out threatens to accelerate the spread of the disease, 
endangering the incarcerated, the staff and the larger community.”). Additionally, there is 
probably serious undercounting of the number of prisoners who have contracted the virus. 
Speri, supra note 7. 
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prosecutors have proposed and fought to implement during the past several 
years.9 In March 2020, many progressive prosecutors joined the chorus of 
voices calling on the criminal justice system to protect the well-being of those 
“behind prison walls.”10 
Of course, the vision of a smaller and more humane criminal justice 
system that motivates progressive prosecutors is not shared by all, even 
during the pandemic. Still, significant reforms can be motivated by crisis.11 
One might even argue that the progressive prosecution movement teed up 
these reforms by changing the terms of the conversation, making mass 
release not only thinkable, but also practically feasible. Progressive 
prosecutors were showing how release could be done before it absolutely 
needed to be done. 
The spread of COVID-19 has slowed many other promising reforms, 
however, including some pushed by progressive prosecutors. For example, 
treatment courts are more difficult to run when there is little or no chance for 
in-person hearings or meetings.12 Some prosecutors in overwhelmingly 
Democratic jurisdictions, such as King County in Washington, have opposed 
release efforts.13 Additionally, it is not obvious whether, or how long, some 
 
 9 See infra Part I. 
 10 Joint Statement from Elected Prosecutors on COVID-19 and Addressing the Rights and 
Needs of Those in Custody, FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION 1 (Updated Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Coronavirus-Sign-On-
Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRR5-HYT5] [hereinafter FJP Joint Statement]. These 
prosecutors were explicit that the proposed reforms were not just good ideas in the middle of 
a crisis, but good ideas, period. See id. at 4 (“Even after the urgent threat of the coronavirus 
subsides, these sensible and smart policies should remain.”); see also Nora V. Demleitner, 
State Prosecutors at the Center of Mass Imprisonment and Criminal Justice Reform, 32 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 187, 190 (2020) (“Generally, highly cooperative jurisdictions in which 
prosecutors have spearheaded release efforts seem to have made more progress in bringing 
jail populations down quickly in response to COVID-19.”). 
 11 See Benjamin Levin, Criminal Law in Crisis, COLO. L. REV. F. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 2) (on file with authors) (“This exceptional situation and crisis mentality offer 
an important opportunity to appreciate the hardships experienced by people affected by the 
criminal system and potentially to save lives in the process.”). 
 12 Robert V. Wolf, In Practice: Drug Courts in the Time of COVID-19, CTR. FOR COURT 
INNOVATION (Mar. 2020), https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/drug-courts-covid19 
[https://perma.cc/6ED4-QJ36] (“Treatment courts rely on face-to-face interactions with 
participants. They also typically require frequent in-person drug testing. And those who 
receive medication, such as methadone, typically have to show up on a daily basis to receive 
it.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Radley Balko, Opinion, Stopping COVID-19 Behind Bars was an Achievable 
Moral Imperative. We Failed., WASH. POST (May 1, 2020, 4:18 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/01/stopping-covid-19-behind-bars-was-an-achievable-
moral-imperative-we-failed/ [https://perma.cc/9XQ8-YYD8] (“In King County, Wash., an 
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of the recent changes to the criminal justice system will last. It may be only 
a matter of time before the ranks of prisons and jails swell back to the status 
quo ante. Before the pandemic, there were already signs of backlash against 
the progressive prosecution movement.14 It is unclear whether this backlash 
will grow in the coming months and years. 
This Introduction seeks to place the articles in this volume into the 
context of a post-pandemic world. COVID-19 has accelerated the timetable 
for many debates that might otherwise have percolated or simply stalled. The 
viability of progressive prosecution is one such debate. Part I provides a 
broad overview of progressive prosecution, focusing mainly on the promises 
made by progressive prosecutors on the way to election and the early returns 
on those promises. Part II sketches how, in the early days of the COVID-19 
pandemic, some state and local officials worked to promote specific goals 
associated with progressive prosecution, including releasing low-level 
offenders from jails and reducing arrests. We also consider the extent to 
which these moves, driven mostly by short-term expediency, are likely to 
endure after the crisis has passed or receded. We conclude by articulating 
some of the challenges progressive prosecutors will likely face in the future. 
I. WHAT IS “PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION”? 
The story of the rise of progressive prosecution has been told in many 
places and in many ways, and it is retold by several of the articles in this 
volume.15 The key idea behind progressive prosecution, however, bears some 
articulation, as it will frame much of what will be discussed in these pages. 
It is somewhat hoary, but not less true for being so, to say that prosecutors 
should see that “justice be done.”16 The notion of justice implicit in this 
 
early epicenter of the outbreak, public defenders filed motions to release low-level offenders, 
the sick and elderly, and those nearing the ends of their sentences. One attorney told me that 
while she and her colleagues attended release hearings in person, prosecutors voiced their 
opposition over the phone to avoid exposure.”). 
 14 See TCR Staff, Prosecutors on the Firing Line: Backlash Against ‘Progressives’ 
Grows, CRIME REP. (June 24, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/06/24/prosecutors-on-
the-firing-line-backlash-against-progressives-grows/ [https://perma.cc/C2FV-KMR3] (“So-
called ‘progressive’ prosecutors around the country are coming under renewed attack from 
critics who say their policies are encouraging crime.”); see also infra notes 85–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 15 See Jeffrey Bellin, Expanding the Reach of Progressive Prosecution, 110 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 707 (2020). 
 16 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation 
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
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dictum implicates the community as a whole—it is a justice for victims of 
crime as well as for those accused of crimes. Prosecutors win when justice 
prevails.17 Conversely, prosecutors do not win when someone is falsely 
accused, wrongly convicted, or unjustly sentenced. 
Somewhere along the line, the story continues, the notion of being on 
the side of justice faded as an animating ideal of prosecution. “Good” 
prosecution became defined in terms of success rates, and success was 
defined in terms of convictions and length of sentences.18 Pursuing justice 
became more about winning at trial or (more often) in plea bargaining. 
Elected prosecutors campaigned on their experience processing cases rather 
than their commitment to treat everyone fairly or promote alternatives to 
incarceration.19 Rather than being informed by the needs of the community 
and the treatment of the accused, justice became “harsh justice.”20 It was 
against this vision of prosecution that Professor Abbe Smith memorably 
argued that being a good prosecutor was incompatible with being a good 
person.21 Maybe prosecutors had not by themselves created mass 
 
done.”); A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTIONS Standard 3-1.2(b) (2017) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice 
within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”). 
 17 See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
607, 642 (1999) (“[P]rosecutors must not only battle lawbreakers, in furtherance of the 
government’s objective of convicting the lawless. Additionally, prosecutors must resist 
various forces that would undermine the government’s other aims.”). 
 18 See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Problems with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV. 
CRIMINOLOGY 451, 458 (2018) (citation omitted) (“American prosecutors are often faulted for 
excessive zeal in pursuing convictions and harsh sentences and for their frequently strident 
opposition to criminal justice reforms that could lower sentences, curtail prosecutors’ 
discretion, or weaken their bargaining position when negotiating pleas and cooperation 
agreements.”). 
 19 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 
591 (2009) (summarizing results of empirical study on prosecutor elections to find that 
“candidates tend to focus on individual qualifications rather than the performance of the entire 
office. When the campaign rhetoric does turn to office performance, the claims relate to 
quantity of cases processed rather than the quality of results”). 
 20 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
780, 781 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (“The constitutional proceduralism of the 1960s and after 
helped to create the harsh justice of the 1970s and after.”). 
 21 Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 355, 396 (2001) (“My answer to the question, ‘Can You Be a Good Person and a Good 
Prosecutor?’, is now probably evident. But, let me say it plainly. . . . My answer is both harsh 
and tempered: I hope so, but I think not.”). 
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incarceration—it took a village22—but they were certainly key drivers of the 
phenomenon.23 Mass incarceration could not exist without mass prosecution. 
Enter the progressive prosecutors.24 Progressive prosecutors focused on 
the power and discretion of prosecutors, which could be wielded either for 
harsh justice or for mercy and leniency.25 On the logic of the progressive 
prosecution movement, lenient prosecutors could make cases go away faster 
than aggressive defense attorneys.26 After all, it is far easier to dismiss a case 
than to fight a rear-guard battle with suppression motions and objections, 
only to settle on a plea deal. The prosecutor could do more than simply play 
defense on an uneven playing field. She could resolve cases with the stroke 
of a pen or even decide not to charge in the first place. 
To be sure, the ideal of progressive prosecution still involves 
prosecuting. Yet, here, too, progressive prosecutors have articulated different 
priorities. They devote resources to resolving violent crimes rather than low-
level drug, property, and “quality of life” offenses.27 Their office policies are 
driven by data, not by perception. The defaults are no longer high bail 
requests, long sentences, and charging the most serious offenses with the 
hopes of getting a good plea deal. Perhaps not all defendants should go to 
prison, even for a short time. For those sentenced to incarceration, shorter 
 
 22 Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 181 (2019). 
 23 See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW 
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 133 (2017) (describing prosecutors as “the most powerful actors 
in the criminal justice system” and concluding that prosecutors “have used this power to drive 
up prison populations even as crime has declined over the past twenty or so years”); but see 
Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018) (contending that the primary empirical bases of Pfaff’s 
conclusion that prosecutorial decision making drives mass incarceration are either disputed by 
other empiricists or are “artifact[s] of changes in . . . court reporting practices”). 
 24 For a good overview of the early stages of the movement, see Sam Reisman, The Rise 
of the Progressive Prosecutor, LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1145615/the-rise-of-the-progressive-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/A5DQ-EV94]. 
 25 See Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive Movement, 
3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1, 5 (2019) (“[J]ust as the power and discretion of prosecutors 
have contributed to mass incarceration and racial disparities in the criminal justice system, 
that same power and discretion may be used to institute reforms to correct these injustices.”). 
 26 See Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=34791
65 [https://perma.cc/9PKP-2QR7] (“Reform-minded prosecutors animated by a principle of 
lenience would work to broadly ratchet down, not redistribute, the system’s severity.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Rachael Rollins, The Public Safety Myth, APPEAL (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://theappeal.org/the-public-safety-myth/ [https://perma.cc/6CHW-398R] (“I believe in 
prioritizing the offenses that cause serious physical harm or death rather than misspending our 
limited resources on low-level offenses. Murders, shootings, and sexual assaults should be our 
highest priority; offenses like drug possession, loitering, and driving on a suspended license 
should not.”). 
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sentences might improve overall welfare. The right kind of prosecution 
policies could lead to “less crime and less incarceration, to the benefit of 
victims and offenders alike.”28 
The promise of such reforms could be exaggerated, of course. In many 
areas, the tactics of so-called progressive prosecution would not, in fact, 
dramatically change the status quo. Murders, sexual assault, and other violent 
crimes would still be prosecuted, perhaps even more aggressively. However, 
progressive prosecutors premised their electoral appeals on confronting mass 
incarceration rather than being a party to it. As such, many progressive 
prosecutors ran on platforms that sometimes read like wish lists for criminal 
defendants. These platforms might be seen as restoring the equilibrium of a 
system that had become misaligned. 
This shift of focus amounted to something of a sea change, and the 
progressive prosecutors announced it as such. The typical prosecutor either 
ran unopposed or based on their record of convicting offenders.29 Progressive 
prosecutors could not run the same way since they lacked “tough on crime” 
records and, in some cases, prosecutorial experience altogether (for example, 
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner, one of the highest-profile 
progressive prosecutors, was a former criminal defense lawyer).30 Instead, 
progressive prosecutors ran on what they would do and, once in office, 
provided detailed policy papers and platforms indicating the reforms they 
enacted.31 
The goals articulated by progressive prosecutors can be placed into 
three broad categories: reducing the total incarcerated population, reforming 
 
 28 MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS 
PUNISHMENT 5–6 (2009). 
 29 See Wright, supra note 19, at 593 (finding that 85% of prosecutorial elections in a 
nationwide study involved a prosecutor running unopposed). 
 30 Jennifer Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasners-
campaign-to-end-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/MY76-DJC6] (“Until Larry Krasner 
entered the race for District Attorney of Philadelphia last year, he had never prosecuted a case. 
He began his career as a public defender, and spent three decades as a defense attorney.”). 
 31 See, e.g., THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO (Mar. 2019), 
http://files.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/The-Rachael-Rollins-Policy-Memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DN3K-DKKY]; see also Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner’s Revolutionary 
Memo, INTERCEPT (Mar. 20, 2018, 8:21 AM), https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03
/20/philadelphia-da-larry-krasners-revolutionary-memo/ [https://perma.cc/GLB6-GT3U]; 
Sam Clancy, Wesley Bell’s Office Announces Policy Changes Including Bond Reform, 
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the institutions of the criminal justice system, and changing the “tone” of 
prosecution.32 These categories are not silos, of course, and certain reforms 
fit in more than one category. Still, they provide a rough taxonomy of what 
progressive prosecutors ran on and hoped to accomplish if they were elected 
(as many were).33 
Nearly every progressive prosecutor ran on ending mass incarceration.34 
Interpreted one way, this is an almost impossible goal. Mass incarceration is 
a complex phenomenon that has unfolded over a long period of time and 
involved interactions among numerous different actors within the criminal 
justice system. No prosecutor, no matter how large her jurisdiction, could 
eliminate it unilaterally. The goal is more tractable if read more modestly as 
a concern with diminishing the large-scale, long-term, racially disparate 
system of incarceration in the United States. Progressive prosecutors 
proposed three broad ways of accomplishing this goal. First, they would 
focus on reducing pretrial incarceration, either by lowering bail amounts or 
eliminating cash bail altogether.35 Second, and more controversially, they 
would enact non-prosecution policies regarding certain categories of crimes, 
 
 32 See generally THE BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
PROSECUTOR, (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/21-
principles-21st-century-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/VDP3-3KCT]. 
 33 For a good overview of the goals of progressive prosecutors, one could do worse than 
this summary by David Garland: 
[P]rosecutors have the power to steer the system toward a more equitable, temperate, and racially 
conscious criminal justice. They can use diversion programs rather than jail, charge with restraint, 
plea-bargain fairly, end cash bail, treat drug addiction as an illness and kids as kids, establish 
conviction review, expunge criminal records, and utilize data and cost-benefit analysis to improve 
decision-making. 
David Garland, The Road to Ending Mass Incarceration Goes Through the DA’s Office, AM. 
PROSPECT (Apr. 8, 2019), https://prospect.org/justice/road-ending-mass-incarceration-goes-
da-s-office/ [https://perma.cc/3VD7-AAGZ] (discussing the premise of EMILY BAZELON, 
CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS 
INCARCERATION (2019)). 
 34 The audacity of this part of the agenda was quickly picked up by major media outlets. 
See, e.g., Gonnerman, supra note 30; see also Daniel A. Medina, The Progressive Prosecutors 
Blazing a New Path for the U.S. Justice System, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2019, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/23/us-justice-system-progressive-prosec
utors-mass-incarceration-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/W54E-YY3F] (“The protester was 
now the prosecutor. And [Wesley] Bell had won on a radical platform promising to end mass 
incarceration, dramatically reform the cash bail system, end the death penalty and 
decriminalize marijuana possession in the county of just under a million people.”). 
 35 See, e.g., THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, supra note 31, at 14–15 (outlining 
policies regarding cash bail); Read Wesley Bell’s New Policies, Issued Jan. 2, 2019, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/read-wesley-
bells-new-policies-issued-jan-2-2019/pdf_d4a5a66c-31b5-5c38-a5f7-f526ad0144cc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MZ8M-MWLM]. 
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such as low-level drug offenses and, in some jurisdictions, prostitution and 
failure to pay child support.36 They might also charge some crimes—such as 
shoplifting—as misdemeanors, rather than felonies—even under statutes 
allowing for felony charges.37 Third, line prosecutors would be instructed not 
to exercise full leverage in plea negotiations, systematically pushing for 
shorter sentences and alternatives to incarceration for certain classes of 
cases.38 
The second category of reforms involved the creation or bolstering of a 
set of new institutions. Two such institutions stand out. First, progressive 
prosecutors sought to create conviction integrity units.39 Such units would be 
less about reducing incarceration in the present (although they might have 
that result on a case-by-case basis) and more about righting past wrongs—
for example, convictions where exculpatory evidence was withheld or cases 
where an innocent person was found guilty. Second, progressive prosecutors 
favored the increased use of specialty courts.40 
Finally, a more amorphous goal of progressive prosecutors involved 
changing the tone of what it means to be a prosecutor, manifesting and 
talking about a more open, less punitive, more holistic approach to criminal 
justice.41 Sometimes this goal had specific policy implications. For example, 
 
 36 E.g., ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH supra note 35, at 5–6 (articulating new child support 
policies for Prosecuting Attorney’s office in St. Louis County, Missouri); see also 
Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner’s Revolutionary Memo, supra note 31, at 1 (instructing 
prosecutors to decline marijuana charges and certain prostitution charges). 
 37 E.g., RECLAIM CHI., THE PEOPLE’S LOBBY & CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUSTICE, 
SENTENCES OF INCARCERATION DECLINE SHARPLY, PUBLIC SAFETY IMPROVES DURING KIM 
FOXX’S SECOND YEAR IN OFFICE 2 (July 2019) https://www.thepeopleslobbyusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/2019-07-Final-Report-Kim-Foxx-ForPrint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/65M7-PRRX]; see also RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, supra note 31, at 
app. c. 
 38 See, e.g., THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, supra note 31, at 37; Philadelphia DA 
Larry Krasner’s Revolutionary Memo, supra note 31, at 2–5. 
 39 Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3542792 
[https://perma.cc/L8TP-N3Q9] (“[A] number of ‘progressive prosecutors’ have instituted or 
increased emphasis on conviction integrity units that are designed to double-check line 
prosecutors’ work and ensure that the office isn’t securing wrongful convictions.”). 
 40 THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, supra note 31, at 6, 35; Larry Krasner, Lecture 
by Larry Krasner, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 99, 118–19 (2019) (describing efforts in the 
Philadelphia District Attorney’s office to provide services to defendants with mental 
illnesses). 
 41 Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Career Motivations of State Prosecutors, 86 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1667, 1709 (2018) (discussing policies championed by groups such as 
Prosecutor Impact and the Institute for Innovation in Prosecution and how these “policy shifts 
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some advocated for open file discovery policies regarding evidence or 
specific protocols on charging criminal offenses.42 Other times, the goal 
showed itself in support of broad public health measures as alternatives to 
resolving public health problems by arresting the people subject to them. 
Perhaps most idealistically, the goal involved projecting an image of care and 
concern not only for victims, but also for criminal defendants who 
themselves might in some sense be victims of social circumstances or 
systemic racial injustice. If this broad goal was realized, then prosecutors 
would be accountable not simply for the number of people they locked up or 
for convictions they obtained in high-profile cases, but rather for their 
contributions to making society fairer and more just. Prosecutors would win 
if they treated everybody—suspects, defendants, victims, and concerned 
community members—with dignity and respect. 
II. PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION IN A PANDEMIC 
When the extent of the COVID-19 pandemic became clear, many 
reformers identified prisons and jails as possible sites of massive outbreaks. 
The crowded conditions of these institutions make disease transmission more 
likely, both within the institution and in the surrounding communities.43 
Worse, prisons and jails are notoriously unsanitary places—some residents 
do not have regular access to soap, let alone hand sanitizer.44 State and local 
officials thus began to plan how to decrease the prison and jail population 
quickly, and progressive prosecutors in many localities championed these 
efforts.45 Pandemic-based decarceration was supported by critics of the 
 
require prosecutors to embrace a more holistic, responsible conception of how law 
enforcement resources ought to be used, and to consider the detrimental impact of prosecution 
on traditionally disadvantaged groups”). 
 42 David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
ONLINE 25, 35 (2017) (advocating that prosecutors adopt “open file” policies). 
 43 Mark Osler, Opinion, We Must Thin the Prison Populations Before Pandemic Hits 
Them, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Mar. 27, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.startribune.com/we-
must-thin-the-prison-populations-before-pandemic-hits-them/569174562/ 
[https://perma.cc/TXY5-WD4Y] (“Jails and prisons are petri dishes for disease in normal 
times. These are not normal times. . . . If the virus runs through a prison, too, it inevitably will 
come back to surrounding communities through prison workers; what goes in will come back 
out.”). 
 44 See Rachel Barkow, Our Leaders Have the Power to Release People in Prison. Now 
They Must Use It., APPEAL (Mar. 27, 2020), https://theappeal.org/coronavirus-prison-
commutations/ [https://perma.cc/9QF7-MU4H] (“Most U.S. detention facilities force people 
to bunk with one or two others, and some require them to sleep and eat in large communal 
areas. Social distancing in these environments is impossible. Even basic hygiene is a luxury: 
Many people in prison have no access to hand sanitizer and struggle to pay for soap.”). 
 45 See FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
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progressive prosecution concept, including Attorney General William Barr.46 
The result was a nationwide push along at least three lines. 
The first major push was to reduce the population of pretrial detainees.47 
In some offices, the default changed to releasing on recognizance those 
charged with low level, non-violent offenses48 Likewise, those awaiting trial 
were either to be given new bail hearings or else simply released on their own 
recognizance if the prosecutor and judge determined that the detainee was 
not a danger to the community. Implicit in these calculations were the general 
restrictions of quarantine—if most people are sheltering in place and most 
businesses are closed, then those released would present less danger to the 
community than in normal conditions. 
A second, less intense push involved releasing those sentenced to terms 
in prison or jail.49 The focus here was on those imprisoned for low- level, 
non-violent offenses, who could be let out without significantly increasing 
the danger to the community. This goal could be accomplished by early 
release (in jurisdictions that would allow it) or by changing the terms of 
confinement—for example, through some form of house arrest or release to 
 
 46 See Memorandum from William Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Department Components and All United States Attorneys 2 (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.justi
ce.gov/file/1266901/download [https://perma.cc/8DBD-D8ZL] (“[Y]ou should now consider 
the medical risks associated with individuals being remanded into federal custody during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Even with the extensive precautions we are currently taking, each time 
a new person is added to a jail, it presents at least some risk to the personnel who operate that 
facility and to the people incarcerated therein.”); Michael Balsamo, Barr Defends Police, 
Takes Swipe at Progressive Prosecutors, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 12, 2019, 1:48 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/barr-defends-police-takes-swipe-at-progressive-
prosecutors [https://perma.cc/G7M8-YGWR] (“Barr took a hard swing at prosecutors who 
don’t embrace the same tough-on-crime stance. He said appointing such progressive district 
attorneys is ‘demoralizing to law enforcement and dangerous to public safety’ because they 
‘spend their time undercutting the police, letting criminals off the hook, and refusing to 
enforce the law.’”); see also William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at 
the Major County Sheriffs of America Winter Conference, (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-
major-county-sheriffs-america-winter [https://perma.cc/YSX4-SPBK]. 
 47 See Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19, NW. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 11–12) (citing examples), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3576163 [https://perma.cc/86LL-E5G2]. 
 48 See, e.g., Kira Lerner, California Makes Major Bail Change to Slow the Spread of 
Coronavirus in Jails, APPEAL (Apr. 6, 2020), https://theappeal.org/california-bail-coronaviru
s-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/9ANX-ZXSM] (“The California Judicial Council on Monday 
issued a statewide emergency order setting bail at $0 for most misdemeanor and lower-level 
felony offenses. The sweeping measure is the state’s latest effort to empty its jails to curb the 
spread of the novel coronavirus.”). 
 49 See FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 3. 
696 FLANDERS & GALOOB [Vol. 110 
a third-party custodian.50 Executive branch officials could also simply 
commute offenders’ sentences.51 Judges might release inmates who were 
already close to the end of their sentences.52 Early efforts along these lines 
emphasized removing especially vulnerable populations from the prison 
system—for instance, inmates who were immunocompromised, sick, or 
elderly.53 The implicit logic was that leaving vulnerable populations in prison 
would be tantamount to sentencing them to death. 
A third, related push involved changes in enforcement policies.54 Police 
and prosecutors articulated clear policies that only the most serious offenses 
would be subject to imprisonment.55 Lower-level offenses could be dealt with 
by warnings or, at worst, summons to appear in court at later dates. Given 
the changed conditions, arrests for low-level or nonviolent offenses, 
accompanied by even brief stays in jail awaiting resolution, constituted a 
public health risk. 
In these three ways, the COVID-19 pandemic gave additional 
momentum to measures progressive prosecutors were endorsing and 
endeavoring to advance already. The movement to end cash bail, already 
popular among progressive prosecutors prior to the pandemic,56 was 
effectively put into place overnight in many places and for many offenses.57 
 
 50 See Carroll, supra note 47, at 11. 
 51 See Jonathan Capehart, Opinion, Trump and Governors Can Slow the Spread of 
COVID-19 in Prisons and Jails, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2020, 9:25 AM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/01/trump-governors-can-slow-spread-covid-19-prisons-
jails/ [https://perma.cc/UA4H-2EJC]; Joe Sonka, Gov. Beshear Commutes Sentences of 
Additional 352 State Inmates in Response to COVID-19, COURIER J. (Apr. 28, 2020, 4:55 PM), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/28/beshear-commutes-sent
ences-352-kentucky-inmates-response-covid-19/3038367001/ [https://perma.cc/E4X5-5J49]; 
Press Release, Washington State Governor’s Office, Inslee Issues New Orders to Reduce 
Prison Populations During the COVID-19 Outbreak (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.
governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-issues-new-orders-reduce-prison-populations-during-
covid-19-outbreak [https://perma.cc/GSH9-CXAH]. 
 52 See Douglas A. Berman, Another Robust Week for COVID-Influenced Federal Sentence 
Reductions Using § 3582(c)(1)(A), SENT’G L. & POL’Y (May 8, 2020), https://senten
cing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/05/another-robust-week-for-covid-
influenced-federal-sentence-reductions-using-3582c1a.html [https://perma.cc/VB65-QRSJ]. 
 53 See FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 3. 
 54 See FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
 55 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. supra note 5; FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 2. 
 56 See Aurélie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The 
Influence of Prosecutors, 8–9 (June 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138 [https://perma.cc/NEE7-EZQ7]. 
 57 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 48.48 
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Prosecutions for drug crimes were deprioritized.58 Prisons and jails released 
scores of inmates, and alternatives to incarceration were adopted.59 People 
were put on some form of supervised release or home arrest.60 Many were 
simply let go. Of course, these changes were not universal, nor were they 
uniformly adopted. In some jurisdictions, it was business as usual.61 In 
jurisdictions where progressive prosecution never obtained a foothold or was 
rejected, reforms were hard to come by and, in some instances, actively 
resisted.62 Indeed, in some places the pandemic was used to justify more 
punitive measures—for example, that people should stay in jail precisely 
 
 58 See Chip Mitchell, During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Low-Level Drug Cases Won’t Be 
Prosecuted in Cook County, NPR (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2020
/03/23/820148938/during-the-c-o-v-i-d-19-pandemic-low-level-drug-cases-won-t-be-
prosecuted-in-cook-county [https://perma.cc/8GZD-3293]; Tim Prudente & Phillip Jackson, 
Baltimore State’s Attorney Mosby to Stop Prosecuting Drug Possession, Prostitution, Other 
Crimes Amid Coronavirus, BALT. SUN (Mar. 18, 2020, 8:33 PM), https://www.baltimore
sun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-ci-cr-mosby-prisoner-release-20200318-u7knneb6o5gqvnqmtpe
jftavia-story.html [https://perma.cc/MEA3-5VL2]. 
 59 Matt Hamilton, James Queally, & Alene Tchekmedyian, California’s Prisons and Jails 
Have Emptied Thousands into a World Changed by Coronavirus, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2020, 
5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-17/coronavirus-prison-jail-
releases [https://perma.cc/W8P2-S7BE]; Emily Hoerner, Hundreds of Illinois Prisoners 
Released as COVID-19 Spreads, but Few Elderly See Reprieve, INJUSTICE WATCH (May 6, 
2020), https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/prisons-and-jails/2020/hundreds-of-illinois-pris
oners-released-as-covid-19-spreads-but-few-elderly-see-reprieve/ [https://perma.cc/7CHJ-
WKYE]; Catherine Kim, Why People Are Being Released from Jails and Prisons During the 
Pandemic, VOX (Apr. 3, 2020, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/3/21200832/jail-
prison-early-release-coronavirus-covid-19-incarcerated [https://perma.cc/ASU2-7LBH]; 
Maggie Vespa, Days After Gov. Brown Calls for Release of 100 Inmates, Lawmakers Call for 
2,000, KGW 8 (June 15, 2020, 9:11 PM), https://www.kgw.com/article/news/health
/coronavirus/oregon-coronavirus-prisons-inmates-early-release/283-615460a6-5451-4772-
a3e1-3fd769c8a839 [https://perma.cc/GPJ4-DGUH]. 
 60 Policastro, Maass & Smith, supra note 4. 
 61 The federal prison system has been especially slow to release inmates. See, e.g., Joseph 
Neff & Keri Blakinger, Few Federal Prisoners Released Under COVID-19 Emergency 
Policies, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 25, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshall
project.org/2020/04/25/few-federal-prisoners-released-under-covid-19-emergency-policies 
[https://perma.cc/NTZ6-YNF7]. 
 62 For example, in May 2020 one district attorney in Oklahoma argued that Oklahoma’s 
Pardon and Parole Board lacked the authority to recommend the commutation of certain kinds 
of sentences and that its consideration of commutation applications “has got to stop. They 
have gone way too far, and public safety and the verdicts and sentences of judges and juries 
are being attacked on a monthly basis . . . .” Press Release, Payne Cty. Dist. Att’y, (May 4, 
2020), https://www.1600kush.com/news/payne-county-da-press-release-5-4-2020 [https://per
ma.cc/K7CS-VZGD]; see also infra notes 77–78, 80. 
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because they needed to be contained.63 On this logic, the general public 
needed protection from incarcerated people not only because they were 
dangerous, but also because they might be sick. If decarceration policies 
cannot gain traction in such jurisdictions despite the public health rationale 
provided by a historic emergency, will they ever? 
Moreover, the salience of public-health-focused efforts at decarceration 
could complicate many ongoing policies that are at the core of the 
progressive prosecution agenda. Consider treatment courts.64 Intake 
procedures for new clients have been postponed until the pandemic breaks or 
suitable online procedures are developed.65 If treatment staff cannot show up 
to court or have regular meetings with clients, then treatment programs 
generally—and their clients in particular—might suffer.66 Likewise, many 
treatment courts require in-person employment as part of their curriculum.67 
If discussions about relaxing in-person work restrictions escalate and become 
more politicized, then treatment courts may be faced with new quandaries—
 
 63 In response to a lawsuit by the ACLU of Connecticut seeking the release of incarcerated 
people in order to slow the spread of COVID-19, the defense argued that releasing “large 
numbers of inmates” would be “unreasonably dangerous to the community and the public,” 
since “the social support networks in the communities in the cities and towns to which these 
offenders would be released [have] been dramatically impacted by the COVID-19 public 
health emergency” and “a dramatic increase in releases would make [the reintegration] process 
not only much more difficult, but also would inevitably increase the health risk to the public 
by releasing individuals prematurely, without adequate risk assessments, health reviews, 
referrals and transition plans . . . .” Defendants’ Objection to Motion for Temporary Order of 
Mandamus at 3–4, Conn. Criminal Def. Lawyers Ass’n v. Lamont, No. HHD-CV20-6126477-
S, 2020 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 504, (Apr. 7, 2020), (No. HHD-CV20-6126477-S), 
http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/DocumentInquiry/DocumentInquiry
.aspx?DocumentNo=18978030 [https://perma.cc/9DEN-9GN8]. 
 64 For a sensitive discussion of one treatment court’s adjustment to the pandemic, see, e.g., 
Jonathan Gallardo, Adult Treatment Courts Adjust to Life in Quarantine, GILLETTE NEWS REC. 
(May 16, 2020), 
https://www.gillettenewsrecord.com/news/local/article_ede1c2d0-9c2e-5698-bb9e-d8969
03e84ed.html [https://perma.cc/E549-PEL5]. 
 65 See Rob Abruzzese, Court System Expands Virtual Operations and Opens Up Problem-
Solving Courts, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE (May 7, 2020), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/20
20/05/07/court-system-expands-virtual-operations-and-opens-up-problem-solving-courts/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ZJL-EPE8]. 
 66 See Wolf, supra note 12. 
 67 See Lisa M. Shannon, Afton Jackson, Elizabeth Perkins, & Connie Neal, Examining 
Gender Differences in Substance Use, Participant Characteristics, and Treatment Outcomes 
Among Individuals in Drug Court, 53 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 455, 470 (2014) (“In most 
[drug courts], there is an employment requirement associated with drug court participation; 
the lack of ability to comply with this requirement typically results in programmatic sanctions 
unless there is a specific medical reason why the participant is unable to work and/or if the 
individual is enrolled in a school/educational program.”). 
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for example, if clients are forced to choose between risking their health and 
risking their freedom. Further, the newly-mediated forms of social 
interaction can dramatically complicate even the simple act of drug testing, 
a foundational element of most treatment courts.68 In short, the viability of 
existing treatment court models has already been challenged during the 
pandemic, and the efficacy of many such programs will likely depend on the 
wise exercise of discretion by program officials. 
Conviction and sentencing review units can at least proceed in one 
respect: past cases can still be reviewed. Yet efforts to rectify such cases still 
require in-person contact to conduct investigations and to hold hearings. 
Review of past cases will be delayed because everything is being delayed, 
and priority may go to moving current cases, not in relitigating past ones.69 
Court systems are shutting down70 and will reopen only gradually. Moreover, 
if conviction integrity units are not fully staffed to begin with, then they are 
unlikely to command greater resources given the state and local budget 
 
 68 See Regina LaBelle & Shelly Weizman, Drug Courts and COVID-19, O’NEILL INST. 
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/drug-courts-and-covid-19/ [https://perma.
cc/Q8BS-MK37]; Henry Sotelo, Opinion, Due Process: Specialty Courts and COVID-19, 
THISISRENO (Apr. 28, 2020), https://thisisreno.com/2020/04/due-process-specialty-courts-
and-covid-19-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/G6LE-P55N]. 
 69 In Missouri, the pandemic has not prevented the state from vigorously arguing against 
one prosecutor’s efforts to re-open a case. See Jordan Smith, Missouri’s Attorney General Is 
Fighting for the Right to Keep an Innocent Man in Prison, INTERCEPT (May 4, 2020, 7:00 
AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/05/04/missouri-attorney-general-lamar-johnson-prison/ 
[https://perma.cc/GW8F-MFAU]; see also Jessica Miller, Utah’s Attorney General Is 
Fighting Salt Lake County Over Efforts to Review Cases Where Convicts Say They Are 
Innocent, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2020/02/24/utahs-
attorney-general-is/ [https://perma.cc/J5A7-3SJC]. 
 70 See Sarah Stillman, Will the Coronavirus Make Us Rethink Mass Incarceration?, NEW 
YORKER (May 25, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/will-the-corona
virus-make-us-rethink-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/5BHH-92Z5] (“Even after mass 
releases began, [grassroots organizer Raj] Jayadev feared that many defendants were being 
‘left off the rescue boat,’ particularly those charged with felonies. ‘Just because someone has 
been accused of a crime with a higher bail schedule doesn’t mean they deserve a potential 
death sentence,’ he said. With court systems shutting down because of the pandemic, it was 
harder to advocate for defendants. ‘I don’t even have access to my clients right now—that 
whole system is out the window,’ [public defender Carson] White told me, in March.”). 
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constraints that will likely exist post-pandemic.71 Time matters in light of the 
pandemic. Many defense attorneys are racing against the clock.72 
How will the pandemic ultimately affect the progressive prosecution 
movement? There are several possible ways that public health arguments for 
decarceration could interact with the extant justifications championed by 
progressive prosecutors. An optimistic story is that the relationship will be 
additive—that the original arguments against mass incarceration will be 
supplemented by a health-based rationale, and the progressive reform 
movement will gain a new urgency.73 In other words, those who are not 
persuaded that reducing prison populations is a moral requirement and 
consistent with public safety might nonetheless accede to decarceration 
policies out of concern for public health. Moreover, progressive prosecutors 
will obtain powerful new evidence for their case if the increased release of 
persons from incarceration does not produce significant increases in crime. 
A self-reinforcing cycle might be created: release does not lead to a rise in 
crime or increased risks to public safety, which helps support the case for 
further release.74 
A less optimistic, but still hopeful, prediction is that COVID-19 creates 
a modus vivendi on decarceration policies, rather than a robust and lasting 
consensus. The problem here is that once the pandemic wanes or becomes 
manageable, support for decarceration policies might follow suit. There will 
be change, but that change will be short-lived. In this scenario, people will 
be more than willing to default to the pre-pandemic status quo. It is thus 
worth considering that the movement for reform may become too tied to the 
public health rationale for decarceration to be seen as an end worth achieving 
 
 71 See, e.g., Caroline Beck & Mary Sell, DAs Look to Legislature for Funding Help After 
COVID-19, TIMESDAILY (May 4, 2020), https://www.timesdaily.com/news/das-look-to-
legislature-for-funding-help-after-covid-19/article_5fef3f49-5f0c-5dd9-a1e1-dd2d2797e99
5.html [https://perma.cc/29XE-UCUT]. 
 72 Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Innocent Prisoners Are Going to Die of the Coronavirus, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/americas-inn
ocent-prisoners-are-going-die-there/609133/ [https://perma.cc/ZRS3-3HJP] (“Across the 
country, innocence lawyers are filing emergency petitions to get their clients released from 
prison before the virus can kill them.”). 
 73 This is not unlike what Derrick Bell considered under the broad heading of “interest 
convergence.” Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
 74 See Alexi Jones, Stagnant Populations and Changing Demographics: What the New 
BJS Reports Tell Us About Correctional Populations, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/05/05/bjs-reports/ [https://perma.cc/M58S-5LXE] 
(“It remains to be seen whether jail populations will bounce back up after the pandemic 
subsides, or whether decarceration will become the ‘new normal’—or at least a more 
politically acceptable strategy in places that have been reluctant to reduce jail populations.”). 
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for other reasons. For example, suppose prisons and jails become cleaner, 
more hygienic, and less densely populated as a result of reforms. This status 
would be consistent with the public health rationale for decarceration, but it 
would not address the concern—explicit in many progressive prosecution 
agendas—that decreasing the population of jails and making them sanitary 
and hygienic places to house people is not just a matter of preventing another 
outbreak; it is a matter of treating prisoners humanely.75 As soon as the public 
health crisis passes or public attention is diverted, prisons and the people 
inside them may again be neglected, and the warehousing of people might 
resume. The policies of progressive prosecutors may take place without 
taking hold. There will have been a pause, but not a stop, to mass 
incarceration. 
Indeed, the most pessimistic prediction might be that the public health 
case for decarceration displaces the arguments that progressive prosecutors 
have built: emergencies are the only time to decarcerate.76 Perhaps even more 
cynically, one can imagine that those who oppose the broader progressive 
prosecution agenda will use this crisis to frustrate decarceration by expanding 
the list of behaviors subject to criminal penalties or by insisting that keeping 
people in prison is necessary to prevent further spreading of the virus.77 One 
might even worry about the counter-narrative: that it is not fair that those who 
 
 75 See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUST., WE MUST URGENTLY DO MORE TO ADDRESS COVID-19 
BEHIND BARS AND AVOID MASS INFECTION AND DEATH: GUIDANCE FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BARR, GOVERNORS, SHERIFFS, AND CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS (updated May 12, 2020), 
(emphasis omitted) https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/coronavirus-guidance-crisi
s-behind-bars.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ4G-LRHF] (“Enact emergency policies, practices, and 
conditions to maintain the dignity and health of incarcerated people consistent with COVID-
19 best practices for social distancing and protective measures against infection and spread.”). 
 76 See Levin, supra note 11, at 11 (“[S]uggesting that a particular crisis or set of crisis 
conditions are exceptional risks legitimat[es] the non-crisis conditions and accepting the 
desirability of the old normal.”). 
 77 See Nicholas Chrastil, As Calls for Release of Inmates Increase, DA’s Office Argues 
Against Bond Reductions, Saying Defendants Could Spread Virus if Freed, LENS (Mar. 18, 
2020), https://thelensnola.org/2020/03/18/as-calls-for-release-of-inmates-increase-das-office
-argues-against-bond-reductions-saying-defendants-could-spread-virus-if-freed/ 
[https://perma.cc/RJ2X-ED7Z] (quoting members of the Orleans Parish DA’s office: “If the 
defendant is released on bond during the Coronavirus outbreak and goes into public places, it 
will pose a threat to the general public by potentially spreading the virus to others and 
increasing the rate at which others are exposed to the virus”); see also Chad Flanders, Courtney 
Federico, Eric Harmon & Lucas Klein, “Terroristic Threats” and COVID-19: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3575700 [https://perma.cc/D7HS-JQ6P]; Derek Maiolo, Policing in a Pandemic: 
Citations, Arrests Raise Concern over COVID-19 Public Health Orders, STEAMBOAT PILOT 
& TODAY (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.steamboatpilot.com/news/policing-in-a-pandemic-
citations-arrests-raise-concern-over-covid-19-public-health-orders/ [https://perma.cc/DS4M-
C454]. 
702 FLANDERS & GALOOB [Vol. 110 
have committed crimes get to go free, while everyone else must shelter in 
place.78 More worrisome still is the push in some places to combat the spread 
of COVID-19 in prisons by going on lockdown,79 effectively placing all 
inmates in solitary confinement regardless of their conduct.80 Here, the public 
health rationale works in a decidedly counter-progressive direction by being 
used to further harsh treatment of the incarcerated.81 This prediction, if 
realized, would see the public health self-interest rationale displacing the 
progressive prosecution agenda. Of course, some places will resist any 
attempt to trade off public safety with public health on the idea that criminals 
belong in jail and progressives should not “exploit” the pandemic to achieve 
reforms.82 In such jurisdictions, the thinking goes, the pandemic is no reason 
to deviate from harsh justice. 
 
 78 See, e.g., John Shindlebower, Group Protests Shut Down of State for Virus, PIONEER 
NEWS (Updated May 6, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://www.pioneernews.net/content/group-protest
s-shut-down-state-virus [https://perma.cc/D7CZ-YHAB] (quoting a protestor as saying, 
“We’ve allowed a police state to be created, complete with a snitch line for neighbors to rat 
out other neighbors, all the while we have a governor taking down license plates of 
churchgoers, while at the same time, letting prisoners go free”); Sean Kennedy, Maryland 
Should Not Release Prisoners. It’s Safer for Everyone, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2020, 11:30 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/27/maryland-should-not-release-
prisoners-its-safer-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/QM7B-PWNY], (“In Gov. Larry Hogan’s 
Maryland, honest citizens are confined to their homes on the pain of prison while prisoners go 
free. It seems we live in an upside-down world.”). 
 79 Keri Blakinger, What Happens When More than 300,000 Prisoners Are Locked Down?, 
THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/202
0/04/15/what-happens-when-more-than-300-000-prisoners-are-locked-down 
[https://perma.cc/5BA7-TZUQ]. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prior to the pandemic, the progress of progressive prosecution was 
mixed. Many policies that could be changed by fiat were enacted and 
effectuated immediate results.83 In some jurisdictions, the number of 
incarcerated people declined without a major uptick in crime, although the 
significance of these declines is an open question.84 In some places, however, 
progressive prosecution was at best a distant dream.85 Yet, even the early 
efforts of progressive prosecutors have come under new scrutiny, especially 
at the federal level. The system, as some put it, was “fighting back” against 
reform efforts.86 Attorney General William Barr publicly excoriated the 
policies of some progressive prosecutors.87 Moreover, some attorneys 
general and state legislatures have taken steps to limit the power of specific 
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prosecutors.88 And press attention has been paid to offenders, the supposed 
beneficiaries of progressive prosecution or policies, who have committed 
additional crimes.89 This reoffending, however anomalous, is used by critics 
to condemn all decarceration policies.90 Some critics on the left have argued 
that the changes enacted by progressive prosecutors have not only failed to 
effect real change, they may also have impeded efforts towards a more 
revolutionary transformation of the criminal justice system.91 
It is also difficult to tell how COVID-19 might change the trajectory of 
progressive prosecution. When courts reopen, all prosecutors will face a glut 
of trials and grand juries to complete. In the short term, this may lead to much 
better deals for defendants as prosecutors work to clear their dockets because 
they cannot handle the multiple trials for which public defenders may now 
call. But this may only happen for a time. A return to normalcy, whenever it 
happens, will reinstate the inherently unequal power dynamics of this system. 
In places where prosecutors have been forced by public health crises to 
implement decarceration tactics, the restoration of business as usual seems 
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likely and may even be welcomed.92 Moreover, if there is a rise in violent 
crime, even progressive prosecutors may well turn out to look more like old, 
tough-on-crime prosecutors.93 
These risks of retrenchment point to an additional, possibly inherent, 
problem with the progressive prosecution movement—namely, that its 
success depends on the implementation of specific reforms in specific offices 
and not just at the prosecutorial level. Absent significant legislative or 
executive changes, the scope and longevity of these decarceration efforts will 
be limited.94 A district attorney can refuse to charge minor drug possession, 
but only a legislature can repeal the law that makes drug possession illegal.95 
In general, because mass incarceration is a systemic phenomenon, it is 
unclear whether decarceration policies that do not address systemic issues 
can succeed in the long term. Even one-time mass commutations will not fix 
the structural, systemic nature of mass incarceration. It took a village to 
create mass incarceration. It will take an array of reforms at all levels to get 
rid of it. 
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It is difficult, in general, to determine whether progressive prosecution 
has effected, or will bring about, lasting and beneficial change to the criminal 
justice system.96 A lot of the goals of progressive prosecutors are long-term 
and cannot be measured by what happens this year or next. We are also still 
working out the proper metrics for measuring success.97 This analytic 
difficulty is compounded by the phenomenon of COVID-19. In the near 
future, specific policies championed by progressive prosecutors, such as 
expansion of treatment courts and conviction integrity units, may take a 
backseat to more urgent, docket-clearing concerns. Increases in crime rates 
could lead to public backlash against prosecutors who favored mass release. 
Any decarceration brought about by the crisis may be short-lived. In fact, it 
may only last as long as the pandemic. 
Still, some arguments point in the other direction. COVID-19 has 
provided a new rationale for many of the same reforms championed by 
progressive prosecutors. The crisis has created an opportunity for the creation 
of a virtuous cycle wherein early release of prisoners (or release on 
recognizance of defendants) does not create much in the way of additional 
crime. This, in turn, provides momentum for even greater decarceration. 
Prisons and jails may become less crowded and more humane. Moreover, the 
medicalization of criminal justice policies—treating crowded jails as a public 
health concern—may increase support for treating crime more generally as a 
public health problem. Given the unlikely triumph of progressive prosecutors 
in winning elections and instituting reforms during the past half-decade, hope 
for the movement’s further success might be rational. Although the COVID-
19 pandemic has been an unspeakable tragedy and a public policy disaster, it 
may yet provide the impetus for further reform. 
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